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The paper has the rather ambitious aim to provide territorial scenarios for Europe in a time span of 
thirteen years, up to 2015.
1 The need for the creation of territorial scenarios stems from the high 
economic, institutional and social pressures that the European economy is facing nowadays. From 
the institutional point of view, the enlargement of the European Union has exacerbated regional 
disparities, given the fact that the per capita GDP dropped by 12.5% on the day of the enlargement. 
Moreover, the low infrastructure endowment of new member countries accentuates the disparities in 
the level of physical accessibility, and consequently of economic growth again, between the 
European regions.  
 
From the economic point of view, the globalisation of the economy and the competition put in place 
by emerging and dynamic areas (like China, India and Brazil) are new sources of threats influencing 
future European growth opportunities and income re-distribution among European regions.  
 
The present economic growth tendencies produce at present clear effects on the European territory. 
From one side, they accentuate the physical congestion, and the decreasing returns deriving from it, 
of the most growing areas of the old EU 15, and in particular, of European core regions (the 
“Pentagon” area); from the other, they generate a non-ordered and non-rational land use in areas 
with high land availability, such as the formerly agricultural areas of the new Countries. 
 
From the social point of view, the large migration flows from Eastern to Western European 
countries and from outside Europe generate once again different chances of growth for European 
regions. On the one hand, the socio-economic desertification is in fact a risk for those areas unable 
to get off the ground restructuring processes; on the other hand it amplifies the physical 
development of urban systems, sometimes through a large use of land with the consequence of 
over-extension of the urban area. 
 
The way in which the European territory will look like in the future highly depends on how the 
socio-economic and institutional driving forces in the economy at work today will develop. This 
paper provides an insight into future regional scenarios by assuming different trajectories in the 
main driving forces supporting economic growth nowadays. In particular, the paper is devoted to 
the presentation of two alternative scenarios, built on opposite combinations of alternative 
assumptions on the main driving forces of change.  
 
As we will clearly state in the paper, the choice of all possible combinations in the alternative 
driving forces of change is obtained through a logical reasoning on three main dimensions, namely 
the economic and institutional strategies put in place by three main blocks of countries, the Old EU 
                                                 
1 The scenario methodology has been created by the authors within the ESPON 3.2 project, entitled “Spatial Scenarios 
and Orientations in Relation to the ESDP and Cohesion Policy”, co-ordinated for the Politecnico of Milan by Roberto 
Camagni. The authors are grateful to Barbara Chizzolini of the Bocconi University for econometric support during the 
implementation of the estimate and simulation model. 
  215, the New 12 (the New 10 plus Bulgaria and Romania), and the emerging countries, in particular 
BRasil, India and China – the BRIC countries.  
 
These three dimensions allow to provide intra-European development scenarios on the basis of 
European country economic strategies and reactions, and on socio-economic dynamics outside 
Europe, the latter representing the main challenges for the dynamics inside Europe.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the scenario methodology is presented, as 
well as the simulation methodology and characteristics. Section 3 contains the scenario building and 
the main dimensions characterising the scenarios. Sections 4 and 5 present the qualitative and 
quantitative assumptions, as well as the simulation results, of the scenarios, one for each section. 
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
 
2. Quantitative Foresights: A Methodology 
 
2.1. From Forecasts to Quantitative Foresights 
 
The scenario building exercise presented in this paper can be defined as a quantitative foresight, 
being the result of two major methodological steps.
 The first step of the scenario building process is 
a scenario building step, in which an image of the future is built under the assumptions that a 
discontinuity emerges in the major elements or driving forces that influence and regulate the 
system. In order to implement this step, the effort required is to highlight the major driving forces of 
change, and foresee the discontinuities that might emerge in their future development trajectories. 
This step is very similar to a foresight. A foresight is in general mostly qualitative in nature and its 
aim is to provide an image on radical breaks, on structural (positive or negative) effects destroying 
past tendencies, assuming a medium-term perspective (decades).
2  
 
The second step of the methodology is to insert the changes in the driving forces into a model of 
structural relationships, traditionally linking conditional (explicative) variables and the dependent 
variable. Through an inspection into the future on the effects that the changes in the driving forces 
may cause on the independent causal variables of the model, the qualitative assumptions of the first 
step procedure are translated into quantitative ones, and inserted into the system of structural 
relationships; in this way, the new values of the dependent variable is obtained (Fig. 1). This step is 
more similar to a forecast, in general oriented towards the achievement of precise values of specific 
economic variables in the future, on the basis of extrapolations into the future of a past socio-
economic relationship system. Built in order to obtain a specific value of a certain variable, 
forecasts have in general a quantitative nature, and, being extrapolative of past tendencies, they 
assume a short-term perspective.
3
 
The aim is to achieve neither precise quantitative values of economic elements, nor a qualitative 
image of what the economic system will look like; the aim is to provide the main tendencies, major 
adjustments  to change, relative behavioural paths that will be at work, if some conditional 
assumptions on the main driving forces of change take place. Our approach assumes the 
characteristics of an integrated process, of an analytic and synthetic approach at the same time; it 
links past and future in a joint effort of imagination and control of the complex causal relations 
revealed by the estimation procedure (on past trends and structure). The logic behind is the 
following:  
                                                 
2 On foresight methodologies see, among others, European Commission, 2004; UNIDO, 2004. 
3 On forecasting methodologies see, among others, Armstrong, 1985; Hawkins, 2001; Hendry and Clements, 2001; 
Loomis and Cox, 2000.  
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- starting from a “seminal idea” on the driving forces which are believed to characterize the future 
economic-territorial development and 
- going through an examination of the main past tendencies of the elements that are influenced by 
the changes in the driving forces (based on an econometric model) 
- the basic characteristics of a scenario are built (the big conditional elements, the big possible 
bifurcations in the driving forces).  
- these conditional elements are inserted in the econometric model of the past causal relationship 
and trends through the impact that they have on the causal variables affecting the outcome of the 
system 
- giving rise to the identification of the magnitude of the likely effects. 
 
Fig. 1. Logical steps of the simulation step 
 
  Driving forces of change 
 
(i.e. increasing globalisation, reinforcement of emerging countries competitiveness, steady 
re-evaluation of the euro with respect to the US dollar, EU widening) 
 
New values of causal (independent) variables 
 
(macro-economic instruments and structural variables) 
Seminal idea on the driving forces 
Inspection into the future 
Causal-effect relationship model 
estimated on the past 
Outcome  
(dependent variables of the various sub-models) 
 
(national and regional growth; macro-economic national demand components; population 


















































































































  4Complexity is the major characteristic of evolutionary systems. Our approach reflects such 
complexity by taking into considerations different possible sources of change at the same time; in 
this sense, the approach is not interested in depicting the effects of only one structural break in the 
driving forces of change, as is the case of most qualitative foresights, but of many structural breaks 
at the same time. 
 
Our approach is thus similar to a forecasting exercise because it is rooted in quantitative estimates 
of a relationships system; however it differs from typical forecasting exercises since it inserts 
discontinuities into the driving forces of the system that allow for bifurcations in the dynamic 
trajectories of the system. These discontinuities stem from an inspection into the future, based on 
rational thinking on what the effects would be on the major causal variables if a discontinuity in 
some driving forces occur. These discontinuities in the main trajectories are qualitative in nature, 
and stem from the imagination of what happens to the main causal variables if some structural 
discontinuities in the driving forces are assumed (Fig. 1). It is in this respect that our approach is 
similar to a foresight. 
 
Three main specific methodological steps are necessary in the approach: 
 
-  a  theoretical step, identifying: a) the theory behind the relationships model; b) the 
formulation of the model itself (in verbal or mathematical terms); 
-  an estimation step of the causal relationship model; 
-  a simulation step, identifying (Fig. 1): a) the “seminal idea” on the driving forces expected 
to characterise the future development patterns; b) the impact in qualitative and quantitative 
terms of the driving forces on the independent-causal variables of the model; c) the 
simulation procedure and the outcome. 
 
The first two steps have been extensively presented in previous works of the authors.
4 Instead, in 
this paper we extensively present the simulation procedures in terms of: 
 
-  the simulation methodology and procedures (sec. 2.2); 
-  the seminal ideas characterising the two alternative scenarios (sec. 3); 
-  the qualitative assumptions on the two scenarios (sec. 4.1 and 5.1, respectively); 
-  the translation of the qualitative assumptions into quantitative changes in the levies (the 
independent variables) of the model for respectively the two scenarios (sec. 4.2 and 5.2). 
 
Section 6 highlights some concluding remarks and policy implications. 
 
 
2.2. Simulation Methodology and Characteristics 
 
2.2.1. The Choice and definition of Target Variables 
 
The simulation procedure is based on seminal ideas on the driving forces of change and on their 
(quantitative) impact on national and regional growth. In our methodology the quantitative impact is 
obtained through the change in the values of the variables that represent the levers of growth in a 
                                                 
4 This paper is a third one of a series of papers undertaken by the team in this research field. In the first paper, the main 
theoretical approach to the regional growth model on which the simulation results are based is presented (Capello, 
2005). The second paper is devoted to the presentation of the main driving forces of change at work nowadays and of 
the so-called baseline scenario, i.e. a reference scenario built under the assumptions the present driving forces of change 
will persist in the future and that no drastic changes take place that can change the trajectories of the driving forces 
(Capello, 2006). 
  5quantitative econometric model, developed with this purpose. The model, called MASST 
(Macroeconomic, Setoral, Social and Territorial model) is presented in details in previous works of 
the one of the authors (Capello, 2005). Appendix 1 contains a brief explanation.  
 
The output of the simulation procedure is represented by new values of the endogenous variables, 
calculated by the model at each run (i.e at each year), using the equations with the estimated 
coefficients in the model. There is a total of 12 endogenous variables. At national level: real GDP 
growth rate; consumption growth; investment growth; import growth; export growth. At regional 
level: real GDP growth rate; the share of self employed on total workforce; population growth; 
immigration of people between 17-27 years; immigration of people between 32-42 years; 
immigration of people between 52-67 years); spillovers, i.e regional growth due to the growth of 
neighbouring regions (See Table A.1 in Appendix 1). All other variables are exogenous in the 
model, and represent the levers be used to produce different scenarios. 
 
In order to produce simulations, the values of the exogenous variables are to be set up in the model 
for each year and each geographical unit. This can be accomplished with an ad-hoc procedure, 
providing ad-hoc values, but this procedure would be very hard in terms of data entering and, more 
important, would not make explicit enough the actual hypotheses on which the scenario is built 
upon. To have an idea, to simulate the model for 13 year, the period until 2015, 2108 values of 
exogenous variables are needed at national level and 30303 at regional level. 
 
A significant reduction in the number of values to be entered can be achieved if they are inserted as 
“targets”. We can in fact assume that any regional or national starting value tends to achieve a long-
run value, adjusting to it with a given speed of adjustment. The formula is the following: 
 
) x s(T + x = x t t t 1 1 − − −   (1) 
 
where x is the value of the exogenous territorial variable for a given region/country, T is the long 
run (target) value to which the variable converges and s is the speed of adjustment. A value of 1 in 
the speed of adjustment implies an immediate adjustment (in one year) of the variable to its target. 
This procedure can be used if the variable is expressed in levels and also if it is expressed in yearly 
variations. 
 
The target values can be the same for all geographical units (for example, at national level, the 
growth rate of public expenditure in our first scenario), can be different for each geographical unit 
and entered as a vector (for example, at regional level, the CAP expenditure) or can be 
differentiated by regional/country typologies.  
 
The use of targets has some theoretical implications. First of all, it implies that regions or countries 
of the same type share the same long-run value to which they all convergence. The importance of 
the initial value, therefore, fades out with time. The convergence path is smooth, as implied by 
equation 1. The loss of regional/country differentiation, however, is not total due to mechanisms 
that will be described below. Secondly, once the target is reached, there will no longer be any 
variation due to the scenario assumptions. Hence, this is a reason why the model is not to be used in 
the very long run, where its predictions will be purely extrapolative. Moreover, the model cannot be 
used for long term predictions since the relationships among variables are estimated on the past, and 
cannot therefore be assumed to remain constant over a long period of time. 
 
The national targets are normally differentiated in three main groups: the Old 15 members of the 
EU, the New 10 member states of the EU and, finally, the two candidate member states of Bulgaria 
  6and Romania. This differentiation is due to the economic structure similarities within groups and to 
the fact that, in estimating their equations through a panel, the behaviour of countries within groups 
was not detected to be statistically significant. 
 
As far as regions are concerned, the group differentiation is in 4 groups, being the product of two 
main dimensions: the fact that they belong to the Old 15 members of the EU or to the New 12 
(including Bulgaria and Romania) and their setting. The second dimension takes into consideration 
a classification in terms of settlement structure, between rural, urban and agglomerated regions, plus 
the presence of mega cities inside the regions.
5 In theory, a mega can be present in any type of 
region, but, since it is generally found in agglomerated regions, whose economic structure is also 
very similar to the one of mega areas, the classification in the second dimension is the following: on 
the one side agglomerated regions and non-agglomerated regions with the presence of mega; on the 
other side, rural and urban regions when they do not have a mega.  
 
Also the speed of adjustment can be differentiated between geographical units, by type of variable 
and by scenario. In the scenario design process, structural variables (e.g. the birth and death rates) 
were always assumed to adjust very slowly, for instance with an adjustment coefficient of 0.1. The 
non structural values are assumed to react more rapidly. In the same way, the adjustment speed of 
policy variables is generally higher, but can be differentiated according to the assumed efficiency 
and commitment of public administrations in the implementation of policies; for this reason, the 
assumed speed of adjustment of national policy variables in the two scenarios of this paper is faster 
(0.8) when countries are pursuing modernizing/reactive strategies and slower (0.5) when the 
strategy is defensive/price competitive. 
 
2.2.2. Logic of the Simulation Procedure 
 
Despite the fact that the targets are a mechanism with implicit convergence, the structure of the 
MASST model assures that the pattern of variables is different for each region and each country at 
the beginning of the simulation period as well as at the end. 
 
For regional growth, the regional values obtained at the end of the period are different for a number 
of reasons. The most straightforward is that some targets, those of regional policies, are region-
specific. Moreover, regions belonging to the same settlement structure typology but to different 
countries are affected by different national growth rates. In addition to this, regions of the same 
typology belonging to the same country are located in different places and hence differently 
affected by spatial spillovers. Finally, the same typology of settlement structure can be influenced 
differently by the same variable at the estimate level; for example transport infrastructure affects 
differently agglomerated regions, or human resources in science and technology urban regions. 
 
As far as national growth is concerned, countries belonging to the same group do not converge 
exactly to the same growth rate in the long run. This is due to the fact that the MASST model is not 
simply a top-down distributive model in which the country growth is allocated between regions, but 
also a generative model where the performance of regions affects the one of the country to which 
they belong. The regional growth rate is in fact due to the addition of the national growth rate to a 
differential shift. Both are estimated, and the first component is a function of many economic 
variables including lagged income growth. The differential shift, instead, is a function of many 
structural variables, which can improve their value in the simulation period. This would imply that 
the differential shift within a country could arrive to an average which is larger than 0, and it would 
be important to make the improvements of regional competitiveness affect national growth. An 
                                                 
5 The settlement structure typology has been defined by another ESPON project, number 1.1.1. 
  7assumption is needed, and this is that the potential of growth expressed by the regions influences 
the performance of countries with a short lag, for instance of 1 year. 
 
Operatively, the generative element in the MASST model is taken into account in the simulation 
procedure in the following way. In the first year of simulation (2003), a value for national growth is 
obtained from the national sub-model (point A in Table 1); at the same time a value for the 
differential shift is obtained from the regional sub-model (point B in the same table). The weighted 
average of regional shifts can be different from 0, for this reason, being redistributive in the short 
run, the new value of regional growth is obtained as the sum of the national growth and regional 
differential components, rescaled so that it is equal to the national value (point C). This represents 
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  ,    i=1..27, j,k=1..259 
(2) 
 
The sum of the national growth and regional differential components represents the potential 
production capacities of the regions (point D in Table 1). This represents the ex-ante regional 
growth and therefore it contains the generative element of regions on national growth. Being the 





































+ = + =   , 
         i=1..27,  j=1..259 
(3) 
 
The MASST model assumes that this potential national growth influences the national variables in 
the following period, through the choices of Investments, Consumption, Imports. In all these cases, 
the behaviour of economic agents will internalize the potential growth and adapt to this. 
 
For this reason, in each year starting with 2004, the calculation of actual national growth (dYn) will 




3. Building the Scenarios 
 
3.1. Driving Forces of Change and Their Possible Combinations  
 
The methodology described above and applied to the present work to provide future territorial 
scenarios requires first of all the identification of the driving forces of change at work today, in 
order to foresee their possible bifurcations, their possible alternative trajectories, which give rise to 
alternative scenarios. 
 
Socio-economic and institutional driving forces at work nowadays are rather profound and will 
shape the picture of the EU territory in the future, according to their future development. They are 
of different nature, economic, institutional, social. 
 
 
  8Table 1. Logic of the Simulation Procedure*  
 
  year 2003    year 2004 (and following) 
      
Estimated national growth 
(dYn) 
A2003) Calculation of actual 
national growth (dependent 
on dYn of 2002 and 
independent variables 
targets) with the national 
model. 
(output of MASST in 2003). 
 
 A 2004) Calculation of actual 
national growth (dependent 
on dPYn of 2003 and 
independent variables 
targets) with the national 
model. 
(output of MASST in 2004). 
 
 B B2003) Calculation of 
regional differential shift 
(DIFr, dependent on dYn of 
2002 and independent 
variables targets) with the 
regional model. 
 
 B B2004) Calculation of 
regional differential shift 
(dependent on dYn of 2003 
and independent variables 
targets) with the regional 
model. 
 
Estimated regional growth 
(dYr) 
C2003) Regional growth is 
calculated as the sum of A 
and B, where B is rescaled 
to have 0 mean within each 
country. 
(Output of MASST in 
2003). 
 
 C 2004) Regional growth is 
calculated as the sum of A 
and B, where B is rescaled 
to have 0 mean within each 
country. 
(Output of MASST in 
2004). 
 
 D 2003) Potential regional 
growth (dPYn) is equal to 
the sum of A and B, non 
rescaled. 
Potential national growth is 
equal to the weighed 
average of potential regional 
growth rates. 
 
 D 2004) Potential regional 
growth is equal to the sum of 
A and B, non rescaled. 
Potential national growth is 
equal to the weighed 
average of potential regional 
growth rates. 
 
      
* Last year with actual data is 2002. 
 
 
Economic driving forces  
 
The European economy is at present facing different challenges. The first challenge is the steadily 
increasing globalisation process; the most sensitive, and accentuated, aspect of globalisation is the 
emergence of new large economies at world scale, in particular in Latin America (Brazil) and in 
Asia (India and China), the so-called BRIC countries.  
 
The bifurcation in this driving force is related to the type of global competition that will be put in 
place by these countries. Two main extreme alternative bifurcations are foreseen in this respect, 
namely:  
-  a modernising strategy, i.e. a qualitative jump of BRIC countries in the modernising process 
of their production processes; more qualified input factors (higher quality in human capital, 
more advanced production technologies), more local knowledge in value added industries, a 
modern market regulation system would shift the nature of global competition towards a 
competition based on quality and product innovation rather than price; 
-  a reinforcement of the present price-competitive strategy, based on low labour and land 
costs, and therefore on low-cost products in low and medium technology sectors. 
…
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A second important driving force is the European competitive strategies, different between the old 
countries of the European Union (now on defined as Old 15) and the new 10 member countries of 
the EU, together with Bulgaria and Romania (now on defined as New 12).  
 
As for the Old 15, the extreme alternative competitive strategies that can be foreseen are: 
-  a reactive strategy, developed by re-launching value added activities, reinforcing R&S 
private and public investments, modernising transport infrastructure endowment on the basis 
of profitability aims and competing on the basis of high quality standards; 
-  a defensive strategy, based on a protectionism approach vis-à-vis the external world, on the 
expansion towards external markets through devaluation, on a particular attention to internal 
socio-economic disparities, on a reinforcement of the institutional achievements already at 
work. 
 
On their turns, the New 12 countries have two alternative strategies to follow: 
-  a reconverting strategy, catching-up with the Old 15 countries, in terms of quality of 
production processes, input factors, knowledge and output quality. Competitiveness is 
achieved on the basis of a decisive reconverting process from agricultural to industrial 
sectors based on internal investments and internal material and non-material resources, 
giving rise to an endogenous growth. A process of tertiarisation of the economy, especially 
in core areas, is part of this endogenous development pattern; 
-  a  cost-competitive strategy, purely based on the exploitation of low labour cost as an 
attractive element for foreign direct investments, and therefore on an external resource 
driven economy. A tendency of these countries to become the “manufacturing belt” of the 
Old 15 countries is implicit in this strategy.
6  
 
Another important driving force of the European economy is the management of public finances. 
Two opposite strategies can be followed by the EU members: 
-  a strict respect of the Maastricht parameters; 
-  a flexible management of public expenditures, and of the Maastricht parameters. 
 
 
Institutional driving forces  
 
The main institutional driving force nowadays is the EU integration strategy. The European 
member countries have two main opportunities in this field: 
-  a widening of the Union to new countries, by having new countries joining the EU, 
renouncing to a more integrated Union as the present one; 
-  a deepening of the Union within and between the already existing member countries. 
 
 
European infrastructure policy choices 
 
Another important driving force in shaping future EU territory is linked to the solution of major 
accessibility problems and transport congestions Europe is facing nowadays. The past decade saw 
not only a worrying increase in traffic congestion in urban areas, but also a new phenomenon of 
congestion on the major arteries of the trans-European network, increasing the number of 
bottlenecks. Missing links in the infrastructure, and a lack of interoperability within specific 
                                                 
6 This strategy differs from the price-competitive strategy of BRIC countries, in that it mostly lies on attractiveness of 
FDI through low resource costs, while BRIC country strategies are mainly concerned with an export-driven strategy of 
low price products. 
  10transport modes and for inter-modal transport systems, are all reasons aggravating this congestion 
of the network.  
 
The decisions on EU transport policies can be based on two different principles: 
-  an efficiency principle, oriented towards the development of TEN and TINA projects on the 
basis of profitability aims; 
-  a cohesion principle, claiming the selection of TEN and TINA projects on rebalancing 




In the socio-demographic sphere, two main driving forces are nowadays at work, which will 
drastically shape the EU territory, according to the way they will develop.  
 
Compared with major global population trends at world scale, Europe is famously out of line with 
its natural population declining or at zero in the majority of European states. At the same time, as 
other parts of the world, Europe is experiencing high levels of in-migration.  
 
Two may be the alternative trajectories in this field in Europe: 
-  a drastic increase of in-migration from outside Europe, through a strategy of openness of 
European countries. In-migration from outside Europe is the sole means by which many 
national population levels are being maintained; under this assumption, an increase in the 
natural population growth rate is expected; 
-  a drastic closure of European borders, with very little possibilities for foreigner people 
outside Europe to join European countries. The natural population growth rate would in that 
case be very limited.  
 
Energy source policy 
 
Another crucial driving force in the future will be the strategies developed by European countries in 
terms of energy production. The two possible (extreme) alternatives in this field are: 
-  a dependence on conventional energy sources; 
-  a decisive policy of speeding up the introduction of renewable energy technologies and of 
more efficient energy technologies. 
 
Technological diffusion strategies 
 
The main technological upswings taking place regard the transport and the ICTs sectors. Also in 
this case, a dichotomy can be foreseen in the technological diffusion strategies that can be put in 
place: 
-  a territorially concentrated diffusion of ICTs and transport networks; 
-  a territorially widespread diffusion of these technologies 
 
Different combinations of all possible bifurcations in the driving forces give rise to different 
scenarios. It is of straightforward understanding that the number of all possible combinations leads 
to a very high number of scenarios. It is also of immediate understanding that a random selection of 
all possible combinations in the trajectories of the driving forces would have no scientific meaning. 




  113.2. The Three Dimensions and the Scenarios Cube 
 
The combinations of the possible trajectories of the driving forces in our scenarios are chosen on the 
basis of three main dimensions, representing the economic, institutional and political strategies (and 
reactions) of three main groups of countries, namely: 
-  the modernising vs. price-competitive strategies of BRIC (BRasil, India and China) 
countries; 
-  the reactive vs. defensive strategies of the EU 15 countries; 
-  the reconverting vs. cost-competitive strategies of the Eastern European countries. 
 
The combinations of the possible trajectories of the driving forces that emerge by reasoning on the 
basis of the economic, institutional and political strategies and reactions of these three groups of 
countries to the global world economy give rise to interesting scenarios. The interest lies in the fact 
that the scenarios results represent the advantages and costs (in terms of growth and disparities) of 
each strategy chosen by one group of countries, under the assumptions that other groups choose a 
particular strategy. The results have therefore an economic, institutional, social and political 
meaning, and interesting policy implications stem from the scenarios. 
 
Figure 2 represents the three dimensions on which all possible combinations of the trajectories of 
the driving forces are built. Again, the three dimensions give rise to a high number (eight) of 
possible scenarios. Among them, in this work we present two of them, two opposite ones, and in 
particular: 
-  a scenario combined with a reactive strategy of the Old 15, a modernising strategy of BRIC 
and a reconverting strategy of the New 12, i.e. a scenario of an competitive Europe in an 
integrated world (scenario A); 
-  a scenario combined with a combination of opposite strategies, a defensive Old 15, a price-
competitive strategy of BRIC and a cost-competitive strategy of New 12, i.e. a scenario of a 
defensive Europe in a cost-competitive world (scenario B). 
 
Table 2 represents the different combinations of the driving forces that give rise to the two 
scenarios. A competitive Europe in an integrated world is a scenario in which BRIC countries no 
longer compete on the basis of price-competitiveness, foreseen as a short-term strategy when the 
un-sustainable exploitation of low-cost resources (labour and land) in the long run is conceived. 
High labour quality is interpreted and chosen as a winning strategy, together with an integration 
between external and internal resources, leading to an increase in endogenous development 
capacities. High-tech industries are more and more developed, and the Asian and South American 
Tigers enter decisively into the high-tech product markets. The restructuring process is made also 
thanks to the attractiveness of the labour market for both internal and foreign high quality human 
capital; wages and purchasing power of local population increases, opening a huge market of 
millions of people for European countries. Global competition is based on product innovation, on 
customised production and on quality.  
 
On their turns, in this scenarios the Old 15 countries put in place a reactive strategy (Fig. 2). They 
decide to compete on the external world on the basis of an innovation product strategy and through 
a customised production. Open trade outside Europe is seen as an opportunity of growth, more than 






  12Table 2. Different Combinations of Driving Forces of Change: 






A competitive Europe in  
an integrated world 
 








-  A decisive modernisation of BRIC country 
economies; 
-  global customised production and quality 
competition; 
-  a decisive increase in wages and therefore in 
purchasing power in BRIC countries. 
 
-  A decisive cost-competitive strategy of BRIC 
country economies; 








-  Open trade; 
-  a decisive modernisation of Eastern countries 
economies; 
-  an innovation competitiveness strategy in all 
Europe; 




-  Protectionism of EU15; 
-  a cost-competitive strategy of New 12; 






-  Virtuous spending of public expenditure; 
-  strict respect of Maastricht parameters. 
 
 
-  High spending of public expenditure; 







-  EU widening to Bulgaria and Romania. 
 












-  Projects’ selection on the basis of a 








-  Openess to external in-migration; 
-  greater natural population growth due to 
greater in-migration from outside Europe; 
-  high unemployment rates due to the 
restructuring of the economies. 
 
 
-  Closeness to external in-migration; 
-  low natural population growth due to lower 
in-migration from outside Europe; 







-  Introduction of efficient energy technologies; 
-  diffusion of renewable technologies; 
-  low dependence on traditional energy sources; 
-  decisive increase in energy price for higher oil 
demand expressed by BRIC countries. 
 
 
-  Persistence on traditional energy source 
dependence. 








-  Territorially concentrated diffusion of ICTs 




-  Territorially widespread diffusion of ICTs 
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The New 12, on their turn, choose a modernising strategy. They change their productive structure, 
moving decisively from agriculture and industrial and tertiary activities. Economic growth rates are 
based on endogenous material and non-material resources and internal productive capacities, and 
not on an exogenously driven development. Wages increase as an effect of an increase of human 
capital quality, and so does the individual purchasing power, opening a local market for high-
quality products.  
 
On the basis of these strategies, the way in which the other driving forces develop is 
straightforward. A virtuous spending of public expenditure, and a strict respect of Maastricht 
parameters is part of the reactive strategy of the Old 15; economic growth is mostly based on 
private investments, and in general on efficiency principles. Public investments are mainly devoted 
to R&D and value added functions, and the achievement of the goals present in the Lisbon agenda 
is seriously pursued as a “must” for all European countries. On the basis of the same efficiency 
principles, the European Union selects the new infrastructure projects. The open mentality is 
captured also at the institutional level, through the widening of the European Union to Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2008. 
 
Another consequence of the decisive and vital reaction of both Old 15 and New 12 is  an integration 
attitude, seeking for trade openness and for strategies of market penetration in the external world. 
Open trade and open barriers to in-migration stem from this attitude, the latter with the consequence 
of increasing the natural population growth rate. Socio-economic costs, such as high unemployment 
in non-core areas, characterise this scenario, as a result of all restructuring processes taking place in 
the economies. 
 
In this scenario, efficiency strategies influence also the energy industry and give rise to the 
introduction of efficient energy technologies, and to an increase in the adoption of renewable 
energy technologies, with the consequence of a lower dependence on traditional energy sources. 
a) Scenario a b) Scenario b
  14The modernisation of the industry in the BRIC countries causes additional stress on the oil market, 
by increasing the demand for oil products, with the consequent increase in oil price. 
 
The reactive strategy of the Old 15 countries leads to a territorially concentrated adoption of new 
technologies, in both the ICTs and the transport sector, following principles of diffusion in areas 
characterised by high profitability. 
 
A  defensive Europe in a cost-competitive world is a scenario based on a combination in the 
development patterns of the driving forces opposite with respect to the previous scenario. The BRIC 
countries emphasize a price-competitive strategy, producing low-cost products in low-tech 
manufacturing industries. Competition is in this scenario based on local low-cost resources (land 
and labour), which allow for low price products.  
 
The Old 15 countries develop a defensive strategy, through a closeness towards the external world 
and through a protectionist approach of internal markets. The New 12 countries, on their turns, 
focus also on a cost-competitive strategy, with the aim to attract foreigner direct investments and to 
become the manufacturing belt of Europe.  
 
These reaction strategies influence the way in which the other driving forces develop. In this 
framework, the Old 15 countries strategy is oriented towards the solution of European problems, 
towards an economy where public investment address mainly balanced regional development and 
territorial cohesion, even at the expenses of a strict respect of the Maastricht parameters. The EU 15 
countries’ attitude towards competition form outside is seen more as a risk rather than a market 
opportunity.  
 
Closeness to external world holds in this scenario also for new institutional decisions; the European 
Union chooses a deepening of the present agreements among member countries, rather than a 
widening of the number of countries involved in the Union. Closeness also characterises in-
migration strategies, which result in lower natural population growth. Unemployment is kept under 
control and decreases with respect to the baseline scenario thanks mainly to the development of the 
public sector. 
 
The importance of cohesion aims characterises also the choice of the new TINA and TEN networks, 
selected on the basis of a rebalancing of territorial infrastructure endowment gap. Persistence on 
traditional energy sources, which generates a low increase of energy price as in the baseline. New 
technologies in all sectors, like communications, transport and energy sectors, follow a widespread 
territorial diffusion process. 
 
In the next sections, the qualitative and quantitative assumptions will be highlighted and the 
territorial scenario results presented. 
 
 
4. A Competitive Europe in an Integrated World 
 
4.1. Characteristics of the Scenario: Qualitative and Quantitative Assumptions 
 
This first scenario is built on the combination of the three main components in which the BRIC 
countries pursue a modernizing economic strategy, the Old 15 EU members react actively to the 
international challenges and the New 12 EU countries pursue a re-conversion strategy from hard 
manufacturing to a more technological and service-based economy. 
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Table 3 presents the qualitative assumptions derived from the patterns of change (i.e. the patterns of 
development of each single driving force) that each driving force has within the scenario. Each 
qualitative assumption is translated into quantitative values of the levers in the model. The values 
chosen are presented in Fig. 3 and 4, respectively for national and regional variables. 
able 3 presents the qualitative assumptions derived from the patterns of change (i.e. the patterns of 
development of each single driving force) that each driving force has within the scenario. Each 
qualitative assumption is translated into quantitative values of the levers in the model. The values 
chosen are presented in Fig. 3 and 4, respectively for national and regional variables. 
   
   
Fig. 3. National Variables in the Two Scenarios  Fig. 3. National Variables in the Two Scenarios 





The first driving force concerns a global competition based on advanced high-quality products. This 
implies an increase of trade and of trade integration worldwide, as an effect of intra-industry trade. 
The fact that the BRIC countries modernize, has two implications for EU countries: the latter 
benefit from a market effect since they can export advanced products in the wide external market 
thanks to an increase in the purchasing power in BRIC countries. This first effect is however 
lowered by an import-substitution effect taking place in BRIC countries, able to produce internally 
many advanced products previously imported. Our assumption is that the prevailing effect is the 
market effect. The second implication is that also the imports of EU countries will increase, since 
the BRIC countries export also advanced products and not only low-price manufactured goods; this 












































































































































Table 3. A Competitive Europe in an Integrated World: Qualitative Assumptions 
 
a) Economic and institutional driving forces 
 
  Global competition on advanced 
high quality products 
Competitive strategies of both  
EU 15 and New 12 









-  Greater trade integration;  
-  a greater external market for 
European countries; 
-  global competitiveness on high 
quality products. 
-  increase in salaries more than 
productivity due to higher share 
of high quality human capital;  
-  further specialisation in 
advanced economic activities  
and full implementation of the 
Lisbon agenda; 
-  an increase in real interest rates 
due to a higher world demand of 
capital accumulation; 
-  a constant transfer from external 
to endogenous resources, 
leading to a limited increase in 
the share of FDI in Eastern 
countries; 
-  a revaluation of the European 
currencies, partly 
counterbalanced by a 
revaluation of BRIC currencies. 
-  Strict observation of the 
Maastricht parameters; 
-  a decrease in inflation rate. 
 
-  Widening of the European 
Union to Bulgaria and Romania. 
-  CAP restructuring process 
applied also to New Member 
Countries, i.e.: 
 * same amount of CAP funds 
between the New 10 and the 
old EU15 in 2015; after 2008 
funds distributed also to 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
-  structural funds distribution on 
the basis of the “political 
agreement” of 50% to EU15 and 
50% to the New 10 and after 
2008 also to Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
 
b) Infrastructure, socio-economic and technological driving forces 
 
  European infrastructure  
Policy with profitability aims 
 







on the  
levers 
 
-  the development of TINA and 
TEN infrastructures on 
profitability aims. 
 
-  increasing external in-migration 
growth rates and an increase of 
natural population growth i.e.: 
* an increase in fertility rates 
and a decrease in mortality rates. 
* a tendency of in-migration 
from outside Europe. 
-  decisive increase of energy price 
due to the increase in a massive 
use of energy by population in 
BRIC countries; 
-  limited conventional energy 
consumption increase. 
 
-  high-speed transport and ICTs 
network development in 
concentrated areas, following 
profitability aims: 
    * concentrated access to ICTs 
and high-speed trains. 
 
  
Fig. 4. Regional Variables in the Two Scenarios 
 


































































These assumptions are translated in the MASST model by an increase of the exogenous growth 
component (due to World demand) of exports and imports of 15% with respect to the extrapolation 
of the present trends but still decreasing of 20% with respect with the past very high speed of 
integration. 
 
The second emerging pattern is the implementation of competitive strategies by both the Old 15 and 
the New 12 member states of the EU. 
 
This can only be achieved through a decisive increase of the share of human resources in science 
and technology, of 30% with respect to the past regional group averages, and an increase in tertiary 
activities, which is more sizeable in New 12 countries (29% over 15 years in rural and urban 
regions and 21% in agglomerated and megas, whose starting values are significantly higher) than in 
Old 15 countries (7% over 15 years), since the latter start with already high values. 
 
The increase of employment in qualified and high-tech jobs implies that wages also rise and hence 
the unit labour cost do not decrease despite of the increase in productivity. The unit labour cost, in 
fact, also represents the share of wages on GDP, a share which remains stable in New 12 countries 
and increases by 0.1% annually in Old 15 countries, due to the higher importance of human 
resources in the competitive strategies of firms. 
 
The real interest rates in this scenario are higher than in a extrapolative scenario of the present 
trends, due to a higher demand of financial capital. Interest rates are assumed to remain higher in 
New 12 countries (2.5%) than in the Old 15 countries (2%), as it was in the past. 
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The re-conversion strategy adopted by the New 12 member countries implies a shift from external 
to internal endogenous resources. For this reason the share of FDI on internal investments does not 
surpass 24%, which is the past average of New 10 countries and to which also Bulgaria and 
Romania converge. 
 
The reactive and restructuring strategies of the European countries have also effects on the socio-
economic situation of regions. In core (mega and agglomerated regions) where the highest 
investments and restructuring processes take place, unemployment rate is expected to be lower (4% 
in agglomerated and megas of all 27 countries) and higher in the less competitive and peripheral 
areas, i.e. 4.5% in urban and rural areas of EU15 and 5% in rural and peripheral areas of New 12. 
By the same token, the share of self-employment increases with respect to the past of 7% in 
agglomerated and megas regions of all 27 countries, only slightly increases (+2%) in rural and 
urban regions of Old 15 and decrease of 9% in the urban and rural areas of the New 12 where it is at 
present higher than anywhere else. 
 
The third economic driving force of this scenario is the strict management of public finances, due to 
a decision of countries to be virtuous in their expenditure and of a limited effort in achieving equal 
socio-economic and spatial development. For this reason, the public expenditure growth rate is 
limited to 0.5% yearly in all Europe, and inflation rates remain very low, at 1.5% in Old 15 
members and at 2.5% and 3.5% respectively in New10 and Bulgaria and Romania where the control 
of prices is less strict. 
 
All three driving forces have effects on the nominal exchange rates: the fact that European 
competition is based on quality implies a general positive pressure on the exchange rates, made 
more important by the strict control of public finances and of inflation, and slightly curbed by the 
fact that the BRIC countries also tend to re-valuate due to the introduction of products of higher 
quality and to their increase in exports. This is reflected, for the EU 15, in a small annual re-
valuation of 0.02% yearly, whereas the New 10 countries, which have higher inflation, devaluate 
but of only 0.11% yearly. Bulgaria and Romania, where the control of inflation is assumed to be 
loser, devaluate more, 0.39% yearly. 
 
The fourth driving force is institutional: in a setting of proactive competitive strategies, the EU 
implements a strategy based on widening instead than of deepening and of increasing internal 
cohesion. The first result of this is the enlargement of the union to Bulgaria and Romania in 2008. 
 
By 2015, the CAP pillar 1 expenses shift (compulsory) to Pillar 2 by 5% but total Pillar 1 expenses 
reduce by 33%; Eastern countries will receive the average Old 15 Pillar 2 expenses per a.w.u. of the 
west, but, since farmers in the East are assumed to decrease in the future of 25% due to 
modernization processes, support per a.w.u. increases in the East by 33%; Bulgaria and Romania 
are included from their entrance in the EU. 
 
Structural funds are reduced: from a standard situation in which the total amount is constant and 
divided equally between Old 15 and New 12 regions, the assistance to Old 15 countries further 
reduces of 2/3 in the four cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and to 0 in the 
other Old 15. In the East, the reduction is more limited, of 1/3 in all countries and regions. Bulgaria 
and Romania obtain the same assistance than the other New 12 countries starting from their 
entrance in the EU. 
 
The fifth driving force is the development of European infrastructure following profitability aims. 
Infrastructure is built according to socioeconomic profitability, based on a cost-benefit analysis 
  19appraisal that includes both environmental externalities and indirect territorial impacts. The total 
investment in infrastructure is less than the total possible, since projects with low profitability will 
not be built. This implies in the MASST an increase differentiated region by region in the 
endowment of main roads, motorways, railways and inland waterways, to the general benefit of 
regions with more demand.
7  
 
The sixth driving force is consists in an increasing openness of the EU to external in-migration. 
This is implies an external immigration growth rate 6% higher with respect to a situation in which 
the present trends are confirmed. Moreover, this openness policy is accompanied by free movement 
of people within the EU, with consequences also on the natural population changes. It has to be 
remembered that all existing population forecasts foresee an increase in mortality and a decrease in 
fertility, due to the process of population aging. This process can only marginally be changed in 
only 13 years. For this reason, in this scenario the mobility of population and the ample external 
immigration is assumed to curbe the effects of migration differently in different types of regions: 
death rates (figure 2) increase of only 18% in Agglomerated and megas regions of New 12, of 25% 
in agglomerated and megas in Old 15, of 29% in urban and rural in New 12 and of 31% in urban 
and rural in EU 15. 
 
Specularly, birth rates increase of 5% in agglomerated and megas regions of New 12, remain stable 
in agglomerated and megas in EU 15, decrease of 15% in Urban and rural in New 12 and of 20% in 
urban and rural in EU 15. 
 
The seventh driving force is the development of renewable technologies, which is due to the high 
increase (6% annually) of energy prices, due to the increasing demand from the BRIC countries, 
both for production and for household consumption. This shift implies that the increase in energy 
consumption is very limited in Old 15 countries (3% in agglomerated and megas, 4% elsewhere) 
and more consistent in the New 12, as a result of the increasing levels of individual consumption 
and of lower efficiency (35% in agglomerated and megas, 37% elsewhere). 
 
The eighth driving force concerns a territorially concentrated technological development: since 
ICTs and high speed train networks are assumed in this scenario to be developed in the central areas 
where there is higher demand and are hence more profitable, this implies an advantage for regions 
with megas and a disadvantage for the rural regions where the population is more dispersed. 
 
 
4.2. European Regional Performance and Disparities in 2015 
 
The competitive Europe in an integrated world scenario registers a more expansive aggregate 
growth rate for Europe as a whole with respect to the other scenario, in line with the assumption of 
greater trade integration and of international trade theories. EU growth rate increases 0.61 
percentage points more in this scenario with respect to the symmetric scenario. Despite the 
revaluation process of European currencies, the “Competitive Europe in an integrated world” 
scenario is a very expansive scenario: European exports growth rate increases thanks to market 
effect which prevails on the import-substitution effect that takes place in BRIC countries. European 
import growth rates increase because BRIC countries compete with high quality products that 
substitute low-costs products, no longer competitive.  
 
The greatest difference in GDP growth rates between the two scenarios is registered in the EU 15 
(0.62 percentage point higher); the aggressive strategy in an integrated world is for the Old 15 a 
                                                 
7 The new regional infrastructure endowment under these assumptions has been calculated by MCRIT, Barcelona, 
partner within ESPON 3.2 project. 
  20winning strategy, entering with success in the vast BRIC market, despite the competition of BRIC 
countries on high quality products. Within the New 12, the greatest difference in GDP growth rate 
with respect to scenario B is registered by Bulgaria and Romania (0.43 percentage point higher), 
given the assumption that in the present scenario they join the EU and are eligible for structural 
funds. The New 10 countries achieve a growth rate which is 0.18 percentage point higher than in 
the scenario B (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 – Difference in GDP growth rates in 2015 between the two scenarios 
 
  Difference in GDP growth rates between scenario A and B 
EU 27  0.61 
EU 15  0.62 
New 10  0.29 
Bulgaria and Romania  0.43 
 
 
The more expansive GDP growth rate is in reality unevenly distributed in European regions. Map 1 
in fact shows: 
-  a general greater GDP growth rate in Eastern countries with respect to Western ones, 
showing that the catching-up process is supported by a modernising strategy of the New 12; 
-  a clear tendency towards a concentrated development in strong areas of each country. This 
tendency is confirmed by the Theil index presented in Fig. 3, where the intra-country 
disparities drastically increase; 
-  as a consequence, in Western Europe, a reinforcement of some regions of the Pentagon 
area, together with most of southern-east of Great Britain and Northern and Central Italy 
countervail the low relative performance of mainly rural areas especially of Greece, Central 
France, Central Spain, Northern Britannic Islands and Northern Scandinavia; 
-  while the most peripheral regions are those performing lower than the rest of Europe, within 
peripheral areas, exceptions are presented by most of the megas, reinforcing the tendency of 
a concentrated development. Lisbon and Porto in Portugal, Madrid, Catalonia, Valencia and 
Bilbao in Spain, Athens in Greece, Paris, Haute Normadie and Nord Pas de Calais in 
Northern France are all regions with a higher performance than rural areas; 
-  while the assumptions favour growth in the megas and agglomerated areas, a less intuitive 
result is the good performance registered also by the potential megas, like Cologne, Bonn, 
Bologna (in Emilia-Romagna), Nice and Marseille (Provence Côte-d’Azur) and Lyon 
(Rhônes-Alpes), Bratislava and Budapest;  
-  the trend towards a concentrated development is clearly evident in Eastern countries, where 
all capital regions (with the addition of Timisoara) register a good performance. On the 
contrary, in these countries, all rural areas register a low performance. 
 
Map 2 presents the per capita GDP level achieved in 2015. Some main trends emerge, namely: 
-  the catching-up process remains incomplete; Eastern countries register a lower per capita 
GDP in 2015 with respect to the Old 15. This is probably due to the fact that if the 
modernising strategy supports Eastern countries growth, the same can be said for an 
aggressive strategy; 
-  the highest per capita GDP is registered in the Pentagon area, and especially in the south-
eastern part of western countries (Austria, Southern Germany) and in the Randstadt-
Holland; 
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Map. 1. GDP Growth Rate – Scenario A  Map. 2. GDP Growth Rate – Scenario B 
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-  mega and agglomerated regions register high per capita GDP especially in western 
countries. Athens, Rome, Milan, Turin, Madrid, Lisbon, Paris, London all Randstadt cities, 
Berlin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, show a high per capita GDP, witnessing 
that this scenario foresee a concentrated development. The decisive increase in the intra-
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country disparities is witnessed also by the increase in the within countries Theil index in 
Fig. 5; 
-  in Eastern countries, a higher level of per capita GDP is registered in mega and 
agglomerated regions. Budapest, Bucarest, Sophia, Warsaw and the other agglomerated 
regions in Poland are an example in this respect. As a result of these trends, while intra-
national disparities grow, disparities among countries decrease, thanks to strong catching up 
processes in lagging countries through their national champions (Fig. 3).  
 



















5. A Defensive Europe in a Cost-Competitive World 
 
5.1. Characteristics of the Scenario: Qualitative and Quantitative Assumptions 
 
This second scenario is built on the combination of the three main components in which the BRIC 
countries continue and accentuate their present price-competitiveness economic strategy, the Old 15 
EU members react defensively to the international challenges and the New 12 EU countries 
compete on prices, becoming the manufacturing belt of Europe and postpone any shift to a more 
technological and service-based economy. 
 
Table 6 presents the qualitative assumptions derived from the patterns of change (i.e. the pattern of 
development of each driving force) that prevails in each driving force. The quantitative assumptions 
are presented in Fig. 3 and 4, respectively for the national and regional variables. 
 
The first prevailing pattern of change concerns a global competition based on the price of products, 
posing an advantage to countries able to produce at low-costs. This trend, together with the 
emerging protectionism of Europe, implies a lower increase of trade (Fig. 3) and of trade integration 
worldwide. The fact that the BRIC countries renounce to modernize their economy in the middle-
run, has two implications for EU countries: they will be able to export less, since the BRIC internal 
market will not grow much; this first effect is however lowered by the fact that the BRIC will not be 
able to compete with European firms in advanced products and will have to continue to import 
them; the prevailing effects, however, is the first one. The second implication is that also the 
imports of EU countries will increase less rapidly, since the BRIC countries will not be able to 
export also advanced products but only mainly low-price manufactured goods; this second effect is 
curbed by the fact that the BRIC countries maintain very low wages and will hence remain price-
competitive. 24
 
Table 6. A Defensive Europe in a Cost-Competitive World: Qualitative Assumptions 
 
a) Economic and institutional driving forces 
 
  Global competition on low-cost 
products 
Defensive strategies of both  
EU 15 and New 12 









-  A greater external market for 
European countries; 
-  global competitiveness on high 
quality products. 
-  Protectionism; 
-  re-gain of cost competitiveness;  
-  low specialisation in advanced 
economic activities; 
-  a very low decrease in real 
interest rates; 
-  an increase in the share of FDI 
in Eastern countries partially 
limited by the geographical 
reorientation of part of FDI 
towards BRIC countries; 
-  a devaluation of the European 
currencies. 
-  Flexible observation of the 
Maastricht parameters; 
-  an increase in inflation rate as 
the result of the devaluation of 
the European currencies and of 
less strict Maastricht parameters. 
 
-  Deepening of the European 
Union: Bulgaria and Romania in 
2007. 
-  CAP restructuring process in 
favour also to New Member 
Countries, i.e.: 
* same amount of CAP funds 
between the New 10 and the 
old EU15 in 2015. 
-  structural funds restructuring 
process with the “political 
agreement” of 50% to EU15 and 
50% to the New 10, excluding 
Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
b) Infrastructure, socio-economic and technological driving forces 
 
  European infrastructure  
Policy with equity aims 
 











-  The development of TINA and 
TEN infrastructures with the 
aim to rebalance the 
infrastructure endowment gap. 
 
-  A decrease in external in-
migration growth rates and a 
consequent decrease of natural 
population growth i.e.: 
* a decrease in fertility rates and 
an increase in mortality rates. 
* a low in-migration from 
outside Europe. 
 
-  Low increase of energy price; 
-  high conventional energy 
consumption increase. 
 
-  Widespread high-speed 
transport and ICTs network 
development: 





 These assumptions are translated in quantitative assumptions by a decrease of the exogenous 
growth component (due to World demand) of exports and imports of 40% with respect to the trends 
of the period 1995-2002, a decrease which is 25% with respect to the extrapolation of present 
trends. 
 
The second pattern of change is the implementation of defensive strategies by both the Old 15 and 
the New 12 member states of the EU. The first implication, the protectionism, has already been 
discussed. 
 
The defensive Europe achieves a far lower (Fig. 4) growth of the share of human resources in 
science and technology, of 14% in all regions belonging to New 12 countries (whose starting values 
are low) and of 7% in urban regions of Old 15 countries. The increase in tertiary activities, will be 
much lower than in the other scenario in New 12 countries (14% over 15 years in rural and urban 
regions and 7% in agglomerated and megas, whose starting values are significantly higher) and nil 
in Old 15 countries where it starts with an already high percentage of workforce. 
 
The very low increase of employment in qualified and high-tech jobs, and the pursue of price 
competitive strategies, implies that wages will rise less than productivity and hence the unit labour 
cost decreases of 0.3% yearly in all 27 countries. 
 
Real interest rates in this scenario are lower than in the previous, due to the lower demand of 
capital, especially for investment in new technologies. Also here, in any case, they are assumed to 
remain higher in New 12 countries (1.5%) than in the Old 15 countries (1%), as in the past (Fig. 3). 
 
The cost-competitive strategy adopted by the New 12 member countries implies that they will 
increase their efforts to attract foreign capitals, for this reason the share of FDI on investments is of 
26%, 2% higher than in the first scenario but not much, since they face the competition of emerging 
BRIC countries in the attraction of these. 
 
The socio-economic situation of the regions is influenced by these strategies. A higher 
unemployment rate is registered in the core areas, due to more frictions in the labour market and to 
less investments in these areas (4.5% in agglomerated and megas of all 27 countries). By the same 
token, the less competitive and peripheral areas register a lower unemployment rate, i.e. 3.5% in 
urban and rural areas peripheral areas of all 27 countries. 
 
The same reasoning applies to the share of self-employment; it increases with respect to the past of 
only 4% in agglomerated and mega regions of all 27 countries, and more (+9%) in rural and urban 
regions of all Europe, including urban and rural areas of the New 12 where it is now higher than 
anywhere else. 
 
The third economic pattern of change of this scenario is a more flexible management of public 
finances, due to a decision of countries to relax the Maastricht parameters in order to achieve more 
internal cohesion and to help firms in their cost-competitive strategies. For this reason, public 
expenditure growth rate is of 2.5% yearly in old 15 and Bulgaria and Romania, who experienced a 
decrease of public expenditure in the estimation period. New 12 members, being out of the Euro, 
and having the constraints of additionality to much higher expense in structural funds, face a 3% 
increase in public expenditure. 
 
Consequently, inflation rates are high: at 2.5% in Old 15 members and at 3.5% and 4.5% 
respectively in New 10 and Bulgaria and Romania where the control of prices is even less strict. 
 
  25All the previous three patterns of change have devaluation effects on the nominal exchange rates: 
the fact that European competition is based on prices implies a general negative pressure on the 
exchange rates, made more important by the lose control of public finances and higher inflation, 
and only slightly curbed by the fact that the BRIC countries will also tend to de-valuate due to their 
price competitive strategies. 
 
This is shown, for the EU 15, in a small annual de-valuation of 0.02%, whereas the New 10 
countries, due to higher inflation, devaluate of 0.15% yearly. Bulgaria and Romania, where the 
control of inflation is assumed to be even less strict, devaluate more, 0.43% yearly. 
 
The fourth pattern of change is institutional: in a setting of defensive strategies, the EU implements 
a strategy based on deepening with the purpose to increase internal cohesion and renounce to 
widening. The first result of this is the enlargement of the union to Bulgaria and Romania is 
postponed to 2015, i.e. after the end of the simulation period. 
 
By 2015, the CAP Pillar 1 expenses still shifts (compulsory) to Pillar 2 by 5% but total Pillar 1 
expenses increase by 50%; also in this scenario Eastern countries receive the average Old 15 Pillar 
2 expenses per a.w.u., but, since farmers in the East are assumed to decrease in the future of 25% 
due to modernization processes, support per a.w.u. increases in the East by 33%; Bulgaria and 
Romania are in this scenario excluded from Pillar 2 support because they remain out of the EU. 
 
Structural funds increase by 50%. In order to support cohesion, the total amount is divided 1/3 to 
Old 15 and 2/3 to New 12 regions; the assistance to Old 15 countries touches all countries, and not 
only the four cohesion countries. In the East, this scenario implies the triplication of structural funds 
assistance, but now Bulgaria and Romania are excluded because they do not join the EU. 
 
Infrastructure is built according to territorial criteria, based on assuring a minimum level of 
accessibility to cities and regions, without regarding the existing traffic or the economic 
development level. Since less developed regions use to have less resources available to build 
infrastructure, this policy requires transfers from most developed regions. Priorities are fixed based 
on reducing territorial gaps, starting by building those projects with higher expectations on traffic 
(so those that may induce more mobility, relations and development opportunities).
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The sixth pattern of change is socio-economic and consists in the closure, as far as possible, of the 
EU to external in-migration. This implies yearly external immigration growth rates of 6% lower 
with than in a situation in which the present trends are confirmed, 12% lower than in the scenario A. 
Moreover, this openness policy is accompanied by lower movement of people within the EU, with 
consequences also on the natural population changes. Population aging will still take place, but the 
effects on regional typologies (Fig. 4) will be opposite from the previous, at benefit of rural and 
urban areas, since the youngsters will not longer have to leave them: death rates will increase of as 
much as 24% in agglomerated and mega regions of New 12, of 31% in agglomerated and mega in 
EU 15, of 18% in urban and rural in New 12 and of 24% in urban and rural in EU 15. Specularly, 
birth rates decrease of 10% in agglomerated and mega regions of New 12, decrease of 20% in 
agglomerated and mega regions in EU 15, remain stable in urban and rural in New 12 and decrease 
of 11% in Urban and rural in EU 15. 
 
The seventh pattern of change is the persistent dependence on non-renewable energy technologies, 
which is due to the lower increase (3% annually) of energy prices, in its turn due to the a demand 
                                                 
8 Also in this case, the new regional infrastructure endowment under these assumptions has been calculated by MCRIT, 
Barcelona, partner within ESPON 3.2 project. 
  26from the BRIC countries which will not grow too rapidly since household consumption does not 
grow much in those countries. 
 
This increase in energy consumption is hence consistent in Old 15 countries (16% in agglomerated 
and mega regions, 20% elsewhere) and even more important in the New 12, as a result of the 
persistence of traditional manufacturing and of lower efficiency productions (62% in agglomerated 
and mega regions, 60% elsewhere). 
 
The eight pattern of change concerns a territorially diffused technological development: ICTs and 
high speed train networks are assumed in this scenario to be developed in order to link all regions in 
the same way. For this reason, central areas, where there is higher pressure on resources, will 
experience the disadvantages of congestion, on the contrary rural regions will grow more due to the 
possibility of teleworking. 
 
 
5.2. European Regional Performance and Disparities in 2015 
 
The defensive Europe in a cost-competitive world scenario is a less expansive scenario than the 
previous one (Table 4). All countries pay in terms of lower GDP growth rates their defensive and 
non-innovative strategies. This is especially true for the Old 15. 
 
Map 3 shows the GDP growth rates registered at NUTS 2 level in this scenario. Interesting 
tendencies emerge from the picture: 
-  a higher performance of the New 12 countries with respect to the Old 15. The model of 
development through external resources of the New 12, coupled with the guarantee of a 
European Old 15 market, is sufficient enough to guarantee a relatively good growth rate 
even in front of a price-competitive strategy of the BRIC countries; 
-  in general, a low performance of the Old 15 countries, a tendency witnessed by vast parts of 
the European territory; most part of Greece, Italy, Spain, the north-western part of France, 
most of England, and the agglomerated regions of Germany register low GDP growth rates; 
-  an absence of a common performance of a particular typology of regional settlement 
structure. Rural and agglomerated regions perform in the west relatively worse than the 
Eastern countries. This is true in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Great Britain, witnessing 
that a defensive strategy in an external price-competitive world is in general a losing 
strategy; 
-  a low performance also of mega regions. Milan, Turin, Rome, Madrid, Lisbon, Porto, Paris, 
London, Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Berlin, register a low GDP growth rate, witnessing that a 
protectionism strategy with strong price-competitive BRIC countries is of detriment also to 
the “champions” of Europe; 
-  the barycentre of growth in the Old 15 moves towards South-Eastern Europe, a tendency 
witnessed by a greater growth in the ex-DDR, Austria, Hungary, Greece;  
-  a diffused good performance of all regions in Eastern countries, especially in capital cities 
and in some important industrial regions (like Timisoara). Interestingly enough, this result is 
similar to the one of the previous scenario; a defensive and cost-competitiveness strategy is 
in reality of detriment also for richer and more dynamic areas. 
 
The general lower performance registered at the aggregate level in this scenario with respect to the 
previous scenario is not equally distributed at regional level. Some regions are in fact able to show 
relatively higher GDP growth rate in 2015. Map 4 shows the difference in GDP growth rates 
between scenario B and A. In particular, the following territorial trends emerge with respect to 
scenario A: 
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-  in general, a defensive strategy in a price-competitive external world is of detriment for both 
the Old 15 and the New 12, the former renouncing to market share outside Europe, the latter 
to the advantages of a re-structuring process of their economies. The map shows in fact a 
very limited fragmentation of relative growth rates; 
-  in Old 15 countries, the relatively lower performance is registered in all strong areas; all 
mega, agglomerated and urban regions show relatively lower GDP growth rates than in the 
other scenario; 
-  a relatively better performance in Old 15 is registered by rural areas. This is true for rural 
areas of Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, France, Ireland, Scandinavian countries, Germany 
and Austria, witnessing that a protectionism strategy provides positive results for the 
primary sector; 
-  a similar tendency characterises Eastern countries, although with some exceptions. Rural 
regions of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria show very good performance rates. In the Czech 
Republic, on the contrary, a relatively good, although not top performance, can be found 
also in urban areas. 
 
By looking at the per capita GDP level achieved in 2015 in this scenario with respect to the 
previous one, some interesting trends emerge (map 5): 
 
-  the catching up process between Eastern and Western countries is uncomplete, despite the 
defensive strategy. Most regions in Eastern countries achieve in fact a lower per capita GDP 
with respect to the previous scenario. A cost-competitive strategy of Eastern countries when 
also BRIC countries compete on the basis of low prices is not a winning one; 
  28-  a higher per capita GDP level with respect to the previous scenario emerges in very few 
regions of both Western and Eastern countries, especially in the rural regions, in part of 
Scotland, in central Spain, in part of Greece, in the ex DDR and in Polish rural areas. It is 
however striking the very limited number of regions getting advantages following this 
strategy and not the most aggressive one; 
-  the less favoured regions are mainly the agglomerated and mega regions. This is true for all 
western Countries but not for Eastern countries where even mega and agglomerated regions 
register a higher GDP per capita than the previous scenario; 
-  Eastern countries in general have a more contained relative per capita GDP decrease with 
respect to western countries, and this explains the decrease in international disparities shown 
by the Theil index in Fig. 5. This also means that a defensive strategy is of detriment to 
Western countries more than a cost-competitive strategy is for Eastern countries. 
 
 





















6. Conclusions  
 
The aim of the paper was an ambitious one, dealing with the implementation of territorial scenarios 
in Europe under different assumptions on the main strategies that can be in the near future be put in 
place by three main blocks of countries, namely the Old 15, the New 12 countries and the BRIC 
countries, i.e. the Asian and South American Tigers.  
 
Two opposite scenarios have been built, based on opposite strategies chosen by the three blocks of 
countries. Some counterintuitive results emerge that is worth summarising, having indirectly some 
policy implications involved: 
-  an aggressive strategy of western countries is a winning one, since the GDP growth rate is 
higher than in the case of a defensive and protectionist strategy. This is true even if BRIC 
countries decide to modernise and to restructure their production activities in favour of high-
tech and value added industries; 
-  a cost-competitive strategy put in place by Eastern countries when also BRIC countries 
pursue a price-competitive strategy is a losing strategy. The average GDP growth rate in 
New 12 is much lower than in the case they decide to pursue a modernising strategy of their 
economies. The choice of BRIC to go for a price-competitive strategy generates a direct 
competition to the New 12 limiting the advantages they can achieve through this strategy; 
  29-  a restructuring strategy of Eastern countries gives rise to a higher GDP growth rate than a 
cost-competitive strategy, and supports a strong catching-up process. However, even this 
strategy leaves the catching-up process rather incomplete, since the per capita GDP in 2015 
remains lower in eastern countries with respect to the Old 15; 
-  the strategies put in place by BRIC countries radically influence growth opportunities in 
Europe, more than anything else, since they represent a huge competitive economic system 
for Europe. For this reason, other possible combinations among the scenario cube can be 
taken into consideration and other scenario results analysed. 
 
Within all other possible strategy combinations, one is rather appealing, i.e. the combination of an 
aggressive strategy in the Old 15 and a cost-competitive one the New 12. This combination 
provides a clear intra-European division of labour which could be of advantage for both blocks of 
countries, based on value-added activity advantages for the Old 15 and economies of scale of large 
scale productions for the New 12, when they become the manufacturing belt of Europe. Even in this 
case, the results are expected to be highly dependent on the strategies put in place by BRIC 
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Appendix 1. Theoretical Approach Behind the MASST Model 
 
Fig. A.1. sketches the relationships system that explains regional growth in our model. A national 
sub-model contains most macroeconomic elements affecting growth at national level, and 
mathematically expressed through a block of equations. A regional sub-model explains the relative 
performance of each region through supply - structural - elements, like the quality and quantity of 
local material and non-material resources. Spatial and territorial elements are taken into 
consideration in the specification of the model, in the form of spatial growth spillover variables and 
settlement structures variables inserted in the model as independent variables explaining growth. 
 
  30Regional output growth is equal to the national growth rate (determined within a national block of 
equations) plus a regional specific differential component. Differently from all other regional 
models, the MASST model in fact estimates the regional differential component rather than regional 
growth. This formulation allows to interpret regional growth as the result of national 
competitiveness and regional performance, an approach which would not be possible if a regional 
growth would be estimated; in the latter case, in fact, regional dynamics would depend only on 
local/regional elements, with no space for national aspects. 
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Thanks to its technical specifications, the MASST model has the following features: 
 
(a) it is first of all an interactive national-regional model. It combines top-down and bottom-up 
approaches, so that an interdependent system of national and regional effects is built. Such a 
  31structure allows vertical feedbacks between the regional and national economy to be taken into 
account; 
(b) it is an integrated model. In its structure, the model finds a specific place for both socio-
economic and spatial (horizontal) feedbacks among regional economies. While the former are 
captured by the socio-economic conditions generating interregional migration flows, the latter 
are measured by spatial spillover effects, being the growth rate of a region also dependent on the 
growth rate of neighbouring regions; 
(c) it is a spatial-territorial model. The spatial and territorial dimensions have a role in the 
explanation of regional growth in two ways. First of all, the model directly captures proximity 
effects through the measurement of spatial spillovers; moreover, with the introduction of 
variables interpreting the territorial (agglomerated, urbanised, rural) structure, the model 
indirectly measures the agglomeration economy (diseconomy) effects that influence growth 
(decline) in a cumulative way;  
(d) it is an endogenous, local competitiveness driven model in the explanation of regional growth 
differentials. Regional differential growth is explained by local factors and interregional 
competitiveness stems from specific locational and local resource endowment of a region; 
(e) it is a macroeconomic (multinational) model. Short term (macroeconomic) effects are dealt with 
at national level, and their feedbacks on national economies taken into consideration in 
explaining local growth; 
(f)  it is a recursive dynamic model. The outcome of one period of time at both national and regional 
level enters the definition of the output of the following period, in a cumulative and self-
defining development pattern; 
(g) given the above characteristics, the model is a multi-layer policy impact assessment model. The 
structure of the model allows in fact to measure the impact of national (and supranational) 
policy instruments on both regional and national growth, and the impact of regional policies on 
national and regional growth.  
 
The MASST model has been estimated for 27 countries, the EU25 plus Bulgaria and Romania, in a 
period of time between 1995 and 2002; its regional sub-model has been applied to all 259 NUTS 2 
areas of the 27 countries. Two countries of Europe, Switzerland and Norway are at present out of 
the estimation dataset due to missing data. All independent variables are lagged one year with 
respect to the dependent variable. The estimation results are presented in Appendix to this paper, 
and reported carefully in our previous works 
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